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This paper provides evidence supporting Grossman’s (1996) claim that not only 
transport costs but also unfamiliarity can explain the negative correlation 
between geographic distances and bilateral trade volumes. A gravity model 
that controls for as many natural causes of trade as possible reveals that 
countries high in uncertainty-aversion (based on Hofstede’s survey) export 
disproportionately less to distant countries (with which they are presumably 
less familiar). More important, this result is mainly driven by differentiated 
products, not by products with international organized exchanges or with 
reference prices. For transport costs alone to explain such a trade pattern, one 
would have to assume that distance-related ad valorem transport costs are 
higher when a trade route originates from a high uncertainty-aversion country, 
which is unlikely. This trade pattern is easy to explain, however, if one accepts 
that geographic distance is a proxy for unfamiliarity and that exporters in high 
uncertainty-aversion countries are more sensitive to informational ambiguity. A 
further result is that high uncertainty-aversion countries trade less and thus 
grow more slowly in the long run, which suggests that cultural factors are as 
important as geographic ones in determining trade openness.  
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The negative correlation between geographic distances and bilateral trade 
volumes is considered by Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) to be one of the most robust 
empirical findings in economics. It is, however, difficult to distinguish whether transport 
costs alone, or unfamiliarity in addition, are behind the distance effects, given that both 
of them are increasing in geographic distances. This paper employs a gravity model that 
allows for distance effects to vary across countries endowed with different levels of 
uncertainty tolerance, so as to disentangle the effects of unfamiliarity from the effects of 
transport costs in bilateral trade volumes. The modeling shows that uncertainty-tolerant 
countries are better in capitalizing on exporting opportunities, and thus have become 
richer in the long-term.  
1.1. Distance and Trade: Transports Costs or Unfamiliarity? 
Gravity models of international trade show that countries trade less with distant 
partners. There is, however, no consensus on what geographic distances are proxying for. 
Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001), among many others, assert that transport costs cause the 
distance effects. Grossman (1996), Hummels (2001), and others, however, argue that 
transport costs are too low to explain the magnitude of the distance effects, particularly 
after taking into account that gravity models can also explain the flow of “weightless” 
goods such as capital (e.g., Portes, Rey, and Oh, 2001; Portes and Rey, 2005). The flow 
of such goods, some theories argue, should instead increase in geographic distances. 
Grossman (1996) conjectures that distance between two trade partners should proxy not 
only for transport costs but also for unfamiliarity (i.e., informational barriers/frictions). 
He further suggests that we need “a model with imperfect information, where familiarity 
declines rapidly with distance” (should have a page citation for a direct quotation). 
Information is very important in bilateral trade. In the search models of Rangan 
and Lawrence (1999) and Casella and Rauch (2003), the difficulty of searching for 
matched buyers in an unfamiliar foreign country can create informational frictions and 
barriers for international trade, particularly for differentiated products. Empirically,   2
Rauch (1999) finds that common language and/or colonial ties can overcome 
informational barriers in international trade and increase bilateral trade, particularly for 
differentiated products.  Among others, Gould (1994) and Head and Ries (1998) 
discovered the roles of immigrants in exchanging information and promoting bilateral 
trade between their host countries and their origin countries. Combes et al. 
(forthcoming), using French data, show that more than 60% of intra-national border 
effects can be explained by the composition of the local labor force in terms of birthplace 
(social networks) and by inter-plant connections (business networks). Controlling for 
these network effects reduces the impact of transport cost on trade flows by a 
comparable factor. Finally, Gelos and Wei (2004) recently found that emerging market 
funds systematically invest less in less transparent countries.  
Kasa (2000) suggests that uncertainty-aversion, interacting with information 
frictions, can create barriers in international trade. Recent developments in uncertainty 
aversion models, such as those by Uppal and Wang (2002), also establish uncertainty 
aversion as a potential cause of home biases in international trade and investment. The 
reasoning proceeds as follows. Uncertainty-averse economic agents dislike ambiguity (i.e., 
situations where information is less available), or as Camerer and Weber (1992) 
classically put it, “people prefer to bet on events they know more about.” In 
international trade, it is not surprising that merchants usually possess more information 
about the domestic market and markets in adjacent or nearby countries. As argued by 
Portes et al. (2001), “countries which are near each other tend to know much more 
about each other, either because of direct interaction between their citizens for tourism 
or business, or because of better media coverage, or because they tend to learn each 
other’s language.” Because of uncertainty-aversion, they would naturally have biases 
against trading with more distant partners (in addition to the consideration of transport 
costs). Furthermore, such bias should be stronger among exporters with higher 
uncertainty-aversion. Here, it is speculated that this bias should be stronger when it 
comes to differentiated products than for products traded on organized exchanges, as   3
more information must be collected when matching buyers and sellers of differentiated 
products. 
1.2. Identification Strategy: Allow Distance Effects to Vary Across Countries 
Empirically, however, it is difficult to separate unfamiliarity effects from 
transport costs effects, as presumably both of them are log-linear increasing functions of 
geographic distances. This paper proposes a novel approach to disentangle the two 
effects, utilizing the systematic variations of uncertainty-aversion across countries 
(quantified by Hofstede’s [1980] cross-country survey). 
Transport cost is function of geographic distances between two nodes, regardless 
of which parties are at the two ends of the trade routes. Unfamiliarity, however, is 
perceived differently by high uncertainty-aversion and low uncertainty-aversion 
countries, and thus the same level of unfamiliarity would generate stronger resistance to 
trade for high uncertainty-aversion countries than for low uncertainty-aversion countries. 
Exploiting this difference, the model in this study allows the correlations between 
distances and bilateral trade volumes to vary across countries. The working hypothesis is 
that high uncertainty-aversion countries, compared to low uncertainty-aversion 
countries, trade disproportionately more with close neighbors and less with distant 
partners than what standard gravity models predict, and this is more the case for 
differentiated products than for products traded on international organized exchanges. 
For transport costs alone to explain such a trade pattern (if found), one would 
have to assume that distance-related ad valorem transport costs are much higher when 
high uncertainty-aversion exporters are involved. This assumption is not supported 
empirically. Although Micco and Serebrisky (2004) and Clark, Dollar, and Micco (2004) 
find that port inefficiency and bad airport infrastructure, respectively, can increase 
transport costs, they enter as fixed costs not proportionate to distance, and they cannot 
explain the differential effects found in the data. Neither can such factors explain why 
the trade pattern is observed for differentiated products only, when they are actually less 
likely to be affected by transport costs (because they generally have higher value-to-size 
ratios). The unfamiliarity and uncertainty-aversion story, however, predicts such a trade   4
pattern very well, if one assumes that the same distance “looks longer” in the eyes of 
uncertainty-averse countries. 
To make the findings as convincing as possible, the gravity model used controls 
for as many as possible of the “natural” causes of trade that have been documented in 
the international trade literature. The empirical strategy exploits variations in two 
dimensions of international trade. The first is variations of unfamiliarity and transport 
costs across country-pairs, both proxied by geographic distances. (For the “distances and 
unfamiliarity” theories in international trade, Anderson [2000] and Loungani et al. [2002] 
both provide good surveys). The second is systematic variations of uncertainty-aversion 
across countries, caused by cultural differences. The assumption is that, for cultural 
reasons, there exist systematic differences in uncertainty-aversion across countries. In 
some cultures, what is unknown is dangerous, while in others, what is unknown is 
curious. This is supported by Hofstede’s (1980, 2001) cross-country survey  of 50 
countries, which finds substantial systematic variations of uncertainty-aversion across 
countries. He finds that typical continental Europeans (Greeks, Portuguese, Belgians, 
Spanish, French, Italians, etc.), compared with Anglo-Saxons and Nordics, are less 
tolerant of uncertainty. Huang (2004), using the results of this survey, finds robust 
evidence that high uncertainty-aversion countries grow slower in industries where 
information is less available, a result that demonstrates the effects of uncertainty 
aversion at a macro level. 
This study is not the first to try to explain the home bias puzzle from a cultural 
perceptive. Den Butter and Mosch (2003) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004), 
using cross-country value survey data, both find that lower relative levels of trust 
toward citizens of a country lead to less trade with that country. 
1.3. Summary of Findings 
The gravity model employed in this study provides robust evidence that 
uncertainty-averse countries trade disproportionately less with distant partners than 
standard gravity models predict, and the results are driven by differentiated products, 
not by commodities traded on organized exchanges or with reference prices. Also, the   5
effects are driven by the identities of exporters, not by the importers. Unfamiliarity 
effects explain this trade pattern, whereas transport costs effects cannot. Furthermore, 
using Frankel and Romer (1999)’s methodology, the study further shows that 
uncertainty-averse countries trade less and grow more slowly in the long run. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical 
strategy. Section 3 introduces the concept and measure of national uncertainty aversion. 
Section 4 estimates the model using aggregate trade volumes. Section 5 distinguishes 
between differentiated products, exchange-traded products, and reference-priced 
products. Section 6 explores how uncertainty-aversion affects long-term growth, through 
the channel of international trade. Section 7 offers conclusions and discusses policy 
implications. 
 
2. Empirical Strategy 
 
A gravity model is employed to test hypotheses. Gravity models commonly are 
used in empirical research on international trade. 
1  To control for as many “natural” 
causes of trade as possible, the specification consists of a comprehensive set of control 
variables. The model allows for correlations between distances and bilateral trade 
volumes to vary across importers and exporters. This is done by including in the 
regression uncertainty-aversion indicators of exporters and importers, interacted with 
geographic distances of the trade routes. The main regression is specified as follows: 
 
Ln (Export Volumex,i,t) = Ln (Distancex,i) (β1 + β2  ×  UAIx+  β3  ×  UAIi) + Ψ  × 
Country-Pair Characteristics + Origin Dummiesx + Destination Dummies i + Year 
Dummiest + εi,j,t 
 
where subscripts x and i indicate exporting and importing countries respectively, and t is 
the year of observation. Ψ is a vector of coefficients. UAI is the acronym of Uncertainty 
                                           
1 For instance, Tinbergen (1962), Pöyhönen (1963), Linnemann (1966), Anderson (1979), Deardorff (1984, 
1995, 1998, 2003), Bergstrand (1985, 1990), Baldwin (1994), Leamer and Levinsohn (1995), Evenett and 
Keller (1998), Frankel and Romer (1999), Helpman (1999), and Rose (2004).   6
Avoidance Indicator, which measures a country’s culture of uncertainty-aversion, 
supplied by Hofstede (1980, 2001), and will be discussed in detail in Section 3. 
Because directions of trade volumes matter for the analysis, export volume 
instead of total trade volume is used. Following previous literature, the dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of yearly export volume (in nominal U.S. dollar) from 
country x to country i in year t. This effectively drops country-pairs with zero trade 
volumes
2. In constructing the interaction terms, as recommended by Wooldridge (2002, 
pp. 194,), we de-mean both UAIs and distances before interacting them. 
Both transport costs and unfamiliarity are proxied by the natural logarithm of 
geographic distance of a trade route. The use of distance as an exogenous proxy for 
unfamiliarity is commonly accepted (Anderson [2000] and Loungani et al. [2002] provide 
good surveys of the evidence). Bilateral distances are exogenously given and provide a 
lot of variations across trade routes. The empirical design creates the following 
interpretation of the coefficients. β1 captures both the transport cost effects and the 
unfamiliarity effect, because the magnitudes of the effects are constant across trade 
routes. β2 and β3 capture the differential (across countries) effects of unfamiliarity on 
export volumes, as distance effects are allowed to vary across countries with different 
extents of uncertainty-aversion. 
If unfamiliarity barriers exist in bilateral trade, the coefficients on the interaction 
terms (i.e., β2 and/or β3 ) are expected to be significantly negative, which means that the 
trade flows from/into a high uncertainty-aversion country are more sensitive to the level 
of unfamiliarity between country-pairs.   β2 and β3 also are expected to be more negative 
for differentiated products than for products traded on organized exchanges, as they 
require more information exchange and thus are more sensitive to unfamiliarity. Both 
transport cost effects and unfamiliarity effects would be reflected by a negative 
coefficient on β1, as both of them increase in geographic distances. 
                                           
2 Ln (1 + Export) also was used as the dependent variable. The results (unreported) show that the signs and 
significance levels of the variables of interests did not change. This is not surprising, as observations with 
zero trade volume make up less than 2% of the sample.   7
Following previous literature, to control for country-pair￿specific factors that 
have impacts on bilateral trades, the model includes dummy variables for whether a 
country-pair shares a common language (English, French, Spanish, etc.), a common 
border, a common currency (e.g., the United States and Panama), a common colonizer 
post-1945, or a common country (e.g., France and its overseas dependencies). Dummies 
also are used for current colonial relationship, previous colonial relationship, and whether 
both countries are members of GATT/WTO or are members of a regional trade 
agreement, respectively. The model also controls for whether either or both of the two 
countries are landlocked or islands, respectively (the two variables can thus take values 
of 0, 1, or 2). 
The model also includes country dummies for exporters and importers, 
respectively, to take out the effects of origin- or destination-specific unobservable market 
attributes or frictions from both the exporter and importer sides. Recent literature on 
gravity models (e.g., Matyas, 1997; Egger, 2000; Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; 
Estevadeordal et al., 2003; Redding and Venables, 2004) increasingly recommend that 
this practice, grounded in trade theory, takes better care of the “omitted variable” 
problems and yields more moderate and reasonable estimates. The practice is very 
robust to alternative theories, whether based on consumer differentiation among goods 
on the demand side (Anderson and Van Wincoop, 2003; Redding and Venables, 2004) or 
on Ricardian differences in technology on the supply side (Eaton and Kortum 2002). As 
exporter/importer dummies remove only time-invariant country-specific factors, the 
model still directly controls for logarithms of real GDP of both countries, although they 
will now only capture time series variations. The coefficients on GDP are not constrained 
to be the same for importers and exporters. 
The data set, compiled by Andrew K. Rose, is the standard in the empirical 
literature. Interested readers can refer to, among others, Rose (2004) for original data 
sources. Estimation of the gravity model is performed for a 30-year period (1970-2000). 
Yearly observations are pooled, and year dummies are included to control for global 
factors such as the global business cycle, the extent of globalization, oil shocks, and so   8
forth. There are very few within-variations for the country-specific explanatory variables, 
whereas there are at most 30 yearly observations of bilateral trade volumes per country-
pair. For this reason, the standard errors reported are adjusted to be robust to potential 
clustering of residuals by country-pairs. In the sample period, the world recovered from 
the aftermath of World War II and became more integrated, to a level exceeding that 
achieved in the Golden Era of Commerce of the 19
th century.  
 
3. Measuring National Uncertainty Aversion 
The measure of national uncertainty-aversion derives from a cross-country 
psychological survey conducted by Geert Hofstede (then director of the personnel 
research department, IBM Europe) between 1967 and 1973. The survey involved a 
naturally matched sample of respondents: 88,000 IBM local employees in marketing and 
customer service positions working in subsidiaries located in more than 50 countries 
around the world. Using this survey, Hofstede (1980, 2001) developed a measure of 
national uncertainty-aversion for 50 countries, which he calls the “Uncertainty 
Avoidance Indicator” (UAI). He defines an individual’s uncertainty-aversion as “feeling 
uncomfortable with uncertainty and ambiguity, and therefore valuing beliefs and 
institutions that provide certainty and conformity,” and national uncertainty aversion as 
the collectively held attitude of a society toward uncertainty. An important assumption 
of this measure is that, for his matched sample of IBM employees around the world, the 
cross-subsidiary difference of corporate culture reflects cross-society culture differences. 
The methodology Hofstede uses to construct this uncertainty-aversion indicator is 
described briefly in the Appendix of this paper. 
The National Uncertainty Aversion indictors
3 for 49 countries around the world 
                                           
3 The uncertainty-aversion survey was carried out around 1970, whereas this study examines trade volumes 
from 1970 through the 1990s. The study requires only a weak assumption that people’s cultures and 
attitudes are stable in the short run. Williamson (2000) argues that culture and particularly religion, which 
is the foundation of all the other formal institutions, usually changes very slowly – on the order of centuries 
or millennia – and the feedback from formal institutions to culture is minimal. Empirically, numerous 
replicate studies, with respondents of different occupations, have produced robust results and attested to the 
persistence of cross-country differences in uncertainty-aversion. In the long run, uncertainty aversion may   9
are reported in Table 1. (Taiwan is excluded from the sample because bilateral trade 
data are not available.] Anglo-Saxon and Nordic countries as well as previous British 
colonies are among those scoring the lowest on the Uncertainty Avoidance Indicator 
(UAI), whereas typical continental European countries (Greece, Portugal, Spain, France, 
Belgium, Italy, etc.) as well as their previous Latino colonies are among those with the 
highest UAIs. Catholic countries in general have higher UAIs, whereas Protestant 
countries have lower ones. A series of data sets collected by La Porta et al, reveals that 
uncertainty-averse countries emphasize formality in judicial procedures (Djankov et al. 
2003) and heavily regulate their labor markets (Botero et al. 2004). These two 
“syndromes” are very much related to two of the questions asked in Hofstede’s survey: 
rule orientation and employment stability. 
 
[insert table 1 about here] 
 
4. Results: Unfamiliarity and Long-Distance Trade 
The gravity model is estimated using aggregate trade volume data without 
distinguishing between differentiated and non-differentiated products. The results are 
reported in Table 2. Columns (1) and (2) of that table take into account the identity of 
both exporters and importers; thus, country-pairs are excluded if uncertainty-aversion 
data are missing for either the exporter or the importer. Theoretically, there are 49 X 
48=2352 pairs of trading partners, but the number of observations varies by year 
depending on data availability.  
[insert table 2 about here] 
 
Confirming findings in previous gravity model literature, the regression results 
show that distant partners in general trade less. The negative coefficient on geographic 
                                                                                                                               
change. The Spanish were not at all uncertainty-averse in the 1500s (Hapsburg Empire), when they 
dominated the long-distance Atlantic trade (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, 2005). Their loss of sea 
power to the English and consequent loss of share in Atlantic trade may have changed their culture, rather 
than trade changing in response to cultural change.   10
distances reflects trade barriers that are proportional to geographic distances, which can 
result from both transport costs and informational unfamiliarity. Most important (in the 
perspective of this study), the interaction term takes on a negative and significant value. 
This result suggests that high uncertainty-aversion exporters are particularly affected by 
the distance effects that they export disproportionately less to distant partners than 
what a gravity model predicts. For transport costs alone to explain this trade pattern, 
one would have to assume that distance-related ad valorem transport costs are much 
higher when goods are exported from high uncertainty-aversion countries, an assumption 
that lacks empirical support. If one accepts Grossman’s (1996) argument that geographic 
distances proxy for unfamiliarity, this finding is completely predictable, because 
uncertainty-averse countries dislike unfamiliarity more than other countries do and 
would attach more negative feeling to the same level of unfamiliarity. 
The magnitude of the effect is economically significant. The results show that, 
ceteris paribus, the increase of national uncertainty aversion from that of the United 
States, a typical uncertainty-tolerant country, to that of France, a typical uncertainty-
averse country, can increase the distance effects by 12.5%. For the United States, 
exports fall by only 1.3% for every 1% increase in distance, whereas for France, export 
volumes fall by 1.5%. A trip of 1,000 miles looks, in the eyes of American exporters, like 
1,250 miles looks in the eyes of French exporters.  
The results also show that whether the importer is uncertainty-averse or not does 
not make a difference, which suggests both that an exporting transaction is mostly 
initiated by the exporter’s active search for matched importers and that partial 
equilibrium search models (which assumes importers to be passive in the search), such as  
employed by Rauch (1996), are a good approximation to reality. Uncertainty-averse 
exporters are reluctant to explore distant markets, whereas uncertainty-averse importers 
are less sensitive, probably because exporters can always push information. This also 
reveals  that uncertainty-aversion reduces a country’s access to distant markets but not 
distant suppliers.   11
Column (2) of Table 2 controls for observable country-specific factors directly 
instead of using fixed-effect country dummies. This is an approach used by older 
literature on the gravity model, and it requires observation of all country-specific 
characteristics that potentially affect trade (which is not possible). The fixed-effect 
approach, since Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), is becoming the new standard for 
bilateral trade estimation, but it is still interesting to compare it with results from the 
old approach to show how unobservable factors affect estimates. The results show that 
national uncertainty aversion of the exporters still makes a difference, but the effect is 
only very marginally significant (p = 0.09). This is not surprising. As suggested by 
Feenstra (2003), when country-specific fixed-effects are not controlled for, the existence 
of omitted variables could cause the fall in statistical significance, as the commonly used 
“weight” controls (GDP, population, etc) miss many details in the bilateral trade 
equations directly derived from new trade theory models (which assume monopolistic 
competition, CES demand, and iceberg trade costs). The comparison of the results shows 
that it is important to control for unobservable country-specific factors using fixed 
effects. Finally, the negative coefficients on UAI terms suggest that uncertainty-averse 
countries in general trade less with foreigners. 
Columns (1) and (2) show that national uncertainty aversion of importing 
countries does not make a difference. Therefore, Column (3) controls only for 
uncertainty-aversion of the exporter countries, so that more of the information in the 
data set can be utilized. That is, the analysis now can examine those countries dropped 
in the regressions done for Columns (1) and (2). The sample size is thus more than 
tripled. The results in Column (1) are very well replicated in Column (3). 
Column (4) includes only Western European countries as exporters. These 
countries are a unity, geographically speaking, but each of them has a different level of 
uncertainty-aversion. Northern countries are more uncertainty-tolerant, while their 
southern neighbors are more uncertainty-averse. Testing the differences of trading 
patterns thus provides a clean and natural experiment. Among these Western European 
countries, there is very strong evidence that uncertainty-tolerant countries trade more   12
with distant partners (which presumably are located on the other side of the Atlantic, or 
in the East, in Asia Pacific). This provides strong support for the working hypothesis, as 
these countries are at similar levels of development and face almost the same trade 
opportunities, geographically speaking. 
Although many factors potentially can affect trade openness (most of which are 
already addressed by the country-specific dummies and country-pair￿specific controls 
included in the regressions), few can affect trade patterns in the systematic way 
identified in this study. Several, however, come to mind. First, Becker and Greenberg 
(2003) show that better financial development can disproportionately help long-distance 
trade (which presumably requires up-front investment). Their preferred measure of 
financial development is accounting standards in 1995. Column (5) follows their choice in 
measuring financial development and includes in the regression accounting standards of 
exporters interacted with geographic distances. Accounting standard data are not 
available for 10 of the 49 exporters. Financial development does indeed foster long-
distance trade, but not significantly, whereas the effect of national uncertainty-aversion 
remains strong, thus suggesting that national uncertainty-aversion is not proxying for 
financial development. Second, economically developed countries may be better able to 
exploit long-distance trade opportunities. Long-term economic development, however, is 
endogenous to culture in the system used in this study.The solution to this problem is to 
utilize the time series variation of economic development, which is presumably less 
endogenous. In the last three decades, world income per capita increased threefold, but 
some countries grew much faster than others. Column (6) includes each country’s log 
GDP per capita relative to its own 1985 level and also interacts this number with 
bilateral distance (the proxy for unfamiliarity). The results show that as an economy 
grows, it actually becomes less likely to trade with foreign countries that are far away. 
After controlling for this, uncertainty-tolerant countries still trade disproportionately 
more with distant foreign countries. 
Finally, there may exist a reverse causality problem in the regressions: National 
culture may change over time in response to international trade. Countries can become   13
more uncertainty-tolerant after dealing with distant countries, but not the other way 
around. To address this problem, Column (7) uses religion composition (the percentage 
of Protestants, Catholics, and Muslims in the population, respectively
4) as a set of 
instrumental variables for UAI. This study is not alone in finding that religions affect 
culture. Among others
5, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003) find that religious beliefs 
have important impacts on people’s economic attitudes. In this study’s sample, national 
uncertainty-aversion is significantly and substantially lower (ρ = 0.49, significant at 1%) 
in countries with a higher fraction of Protestant population, and significantly higher (ρ 
= 0.46, significant at 1%) in countries with a higher fraction of Catholic population. 
Weber’s (1930) theory provides some explanation for this correlation
6. The instrumental 
variable regression results are reported in Column (7) with the same specification as the 
OLS regression in Column (3). The IV results replicate the OLS results that uncertainty-
averse countries trade much less with distant partners. As a matter of fact, the 
magnitude of the effect is much stronger. 
 
5. Differentiated Products, Reference-Priced Products, and 
Organized-Exchange-Traded Products 
 
After examining how unfamiliarity affects bilateral trade volumes at the 
aggregate level, this section will distinguish between trade volumes of differentiated and 
                                           
4 The rest of the population is defined as affiliated with “other religions and atheism.” As usual practice, it 
is dropped from the set of instrumental variables, as by construction it is always equal to 100 minus the 
percentage of people affiliated with the three major religions. 
 
5 La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) find that dominant hierarchical religions such as 
Catholicism deter the formation of interpersonal trust between strangers and thus have a negative impact on 
the performance of large organizations such as governments and large corporations. Stulz and Williamson 
(2003) find that Catholic countries protect the rights of creditors less than other countries, and that long-
term debt is less important in these countries. 
 
6 Weber (1930) links the rise of capitalism with Protestant reformations and thus weakening of uncertainty 
aversion: “The Catholic is quieter, having less of the acquisitive impulse; he prefers a life of the greatest 
possible security, even with a smaller income, to a life of risk and excitement, even though it may bring the 
chance of gaining honor and riches. … The Protestant prefers to eat well, the Catholic to sleep 
undisturbed.” Put formally, Catholics value a predictable life more than an exciting life, whereas 
Protestants do the opposite. It is conjectured that the Protestant reformations in the 1500s could explain 
why the English and Dutch began to challenge and finally dominate the Spanish and Portuguese in long-
distance Atlantic trade.   14
homogenous products in order to shed more light on the working hypothesis. First, 
compared to products with reference prices or traded on organized exchanges, trading of 
differentiated products requires more effort in collecting transaction-specific information 
but less transport costs. Thus, it is expected that unfamiliarity between countries should 
have greater impacts on differentiated products, which require better matches of buyers 
and sellers, than on homogenous products. This, if true, would be reflected by a more 
negative value of the interaction term when the gravity model is estimated with bilateral 
trade volumes of differentiated products. Second, there is a possibility that uncertainty-
averse countries export more exchange-traded commodities (which are heavier and incur 
greater transport costs) than uncertainty-tolerant countries do, which can also generate 
the trade pattern found previously. By “comparing apples with apples”, we can directly 
address this concern. 
  Rauch (1999) argues that information is more important for the match of buyers 
and sellers of differentiated products. He groups commodities (at the three- and four-
digit SITC levels) into three categories: exchange-traded, reference-priced, and 
differentiated. Reference-priced commodities are those for which prices can be quoted 
without knowing the identity of the producers. Because ambiguities arose that were 
sometimes sufficiently important to affect the classification at the three- or four-digit 
level, both “conservative” and “liberal” classifications were made, with the former 
minimizing the number of three- and four-digit commodities that are classified as either 
organized-exchange or reference-priced and the latter maximizing those numbers. Rauch 
(1999) presents evidence that proximity and common language/colonial ties are more 
important for differentiated products than for products traded on organized exchanges. 
  Table 3 re-runs the baseline regression (i.e., using the same specification as in 
Table 2, Column (3)), but separately for each of the three categories of commodities, 
using conservative and liberal classifications, respectively. The disaggregated bilateral 
trade data are from Statistics Canada Trade Data, cleaned and complied by NBER and 
UC Davis. The data are then matched with Andrew Rose’s country-pair-specific 
variables. Differentiated products account for about 50% of trade values, while exchange-  15
traded and reference-priced products each account for about 25%. Following Rauch 
(1999), the model is estimated for the years 1970, 1980, and 1990, respectively, instead of 
all years being pooled, as in Table 2. To save space and also to present the findings more 
clearly, Table 3 reports only the coefficients of interest, which are the coefficients on the 
interaction terms between distance and national uncertainty aversion. 
 
[insert Table 3 about here] 
 
  In all cases, coefficients on the interaction terms, which presumably capture 
unfamiliarity effects, are highly significant for differentiated products. The magnitude of 
the impact is also much greater for differentiated products than for reference-priced or 
exchange-traded products. Commodities traded on organized exchanges are least affected 
by uncertainty aversion. In four out of six cases, the impacts of unfamiliarity on 
exchange-traded products are marginally indistinguishable from zero. Commodities with 
reference prices are more sensitive to unfamiliarity than exchange-traded commodities, 
but the magnitude is always smaller than that for differentiated products. Coefficients 
for differentiated products consistently are thelargest, followed by those for reference-
priced products. In light of the above findings, it is concludec that the results in the 
previous section are driven mainly by differentiated products, which require extensive 
information for matching of buyers and sellers. 
This pattern cannot be explained by transport cost effects. Differentiated 
products generally have higher value-to-size or value-to-weight ratios, and thus they are 
presumably less affected by transport costs. Rauch (1999), basing analysis on insurance 
and freight data of U.S. imports from Japan, shows that differentiated products have 
lower transport costs than reference-priced products, which in turn are more 
transportable than exchange-traded products. The unfamiliarity story, which assumes 
that differentiated products are more sensitive to information asymmetry, however, 
explains the pattern very well: The more information-intensive a transaction is, the more 
cautious a trader is in dealing with unfamiliar counterparties.   16
 
6. Geographic Openness, Uncertainty-Aversion, and Long-Term 
Growth 
 
Frankel and Romer (1999), using geographic openness as an instrumental 
variable for actual trade openness, show that trade causes long-term growth. They show 
that countries naturally more open (i.e., located near to densely populated countries) are 
richer (the result of faster growth in the long term)
7.  
Sections 4 and 5 showed that uncertainty-aversion plays important roles in 
international trade; thus, it would be interesting to revisit Frankel and Romer’s (1999) 
results with the new findings. It is expected that national uncertainty-aversion would 
provide additional and important information to predict a country’s actual trade 
openness and, in turn, long-term growth. The results will also shed some light on the 
debate over transport costs vs. unfamiliarity. (A la Frankel and Romer (1999), this 
study uses geographic factors as well as a cultural factor (i.e., national uncertainty-
aversion) as instruments for actual openness, and it tests for the effects of an exogenous 
component of trade openness on per capita income (the result of long-term growth). 
The actual openness and predicted openness index are obtained from the 
appendix of Frankel and Romer (1999). Due to limitations of data availability for the 
UAI,this study has only 50 countries in its sample, less than half of Frankel and Romer’s 
(1999) samples.  However, the sample here is overrepresented by economically important 
countries and accounts for a disproportionately large share of world trade volumes; it 
thus provides representative evidence. 
 
[insert table 4 about here] 
 
Panel A of Table 4 regresses actual trade openness against geographic and 
culture factors. Geographic factors.(i.e., constructed trade share) explain much of the 
                                           
7 Acemolgu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) further argue that long-distance trade is more important than 
short-distance trade. They argue that the geographic access to the Atlantic, interacted with the increasingly 
important Atlantic trade, caused the rise of Western Europe after the 15th century, whereas short-distance 
Mediterranean trade did not.   17
actual trade share. National uncertainty-aversion, however, provides additional 
information: high uncertainty-aversion countries trade significantly less with foreign 
countries. Another interesting result appears in Columns (3) and (5), which include an 
interaction term between national uncertainty-aversion and geographic openness. The 
term enters negatively
8   and significantly, which implies that, geographically open 
countries (e.g., western European countries) indeed achieve higher actual openness, but 
this effect is much smaller for those with higher uncertainty-aversion (e.g., Southern 
European countries). This suggests that high uncertainty-aversion countries do not 
utilize their geographic advantage very well. Were they more uncertainty-tolerant, they 
would have traded much more with foreigners with so many big countries nearby.   
Geographic and culture factors combined explain 70% to 80% of the cross-country 
variations of actual trade openness, which is unusually high in typical cross-country 
regressions. 
Panel B regresses per capita income against trade openness. Column (1) uses 
actual trade openness directly and tries to find its correlation with per capita income. 
The OLS results show that open economies are richer. The effect becomes marginally 
insignificant in Column (2), however, when constructed trade share (predicted by 
geographic factors) is used as an instrumental variable for actual trade openness. 
Columns (3) and (4) include both constructed trade share and national uncertainty-
aversion as instrumental variables for actual openness. The IV results show that the 
components of trade volumes predicted by cultural and geographic factors cause long-
term growth significantly. The magnitude of the effect suggests that a one percentage 
                                           
8 One may ask why the coefficient is not positive, if one expects uncertainty-tolerant countries to be less 
restricted by geographic factors (i.e., they can always trade with distant partners when there are few 
partners nearby), whereas uncertainty-averse countries should value geographic advantage more highly, 
given that they do not want to trade with distant partners. The explanation here is that when people decide 
to trade with someone, they not only have to decide whether to trade with near or distant countries, but also 
have to decide whether to trade domestically or overseas. In Sections 4 and 5, in order to identify the 
channel through which uncertainty aversion affects international trade, the study emphasizes the choice 
between foreign countries of different geographic proximity, to exploit variation of unfamiliarity across 
trade routes. Nevertheless, the dominant factor considered by traders is actually the option between 
domestic trade and international trade (Anderson and van Wincoop 2003). Taking this into account,  the 
negative coefficient found is not surprising – that high uncertainty-aversion countries trade less than the 
gravity model predicts even when there are many densely populated countries nearby.   18
point increase in trade openness can increase income per worker by 0.8%. The analysis 
also tested for the over-identifying restriction, and the test showed that national 
uncertainty-aversion does not affect per capita income directly, but has to work through 
its impact on trade openness. Finally, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) argue that 
geographic openness is proxying for distance from the equator, because most economic 
activities of the world are concentrated in a band between 20˚ and 50˚ to the North and 
South of the equator. Tropical climate directly affects income level through higher levels of 
malaria and other climate-related conditions. In our case, it seems that at least in 
Europe, distance from the equator is correlated with uncertainty-tolerance. Column (5) 
includes latitude to control for this factor, and the results are still robust. 
The results suggest that geographic distances from trading partners reduce per 
capita income because they create barriers for international trade. More important, the 
barriers created by geographic distances are both physical (by the transport cost effects) 
and informational/psychological (by the unfamiliarity effects). The results suggest that 
uncertainty-averse countries are discouraged from international trade even when 




Gravity models suggest that countries trade much less with distant partners, a 
finding that according to Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) is one of the most robust 
empirical findings in economics. Geographic distances between two countries proxy not 
only for transport costs but also for unfamiliarity and thus informational barriers. 
Informational frictions, interacted with uncertainty aversion, can keep people from doing 
business with unfamiliar people in distant countries. It is, however, difficult to 
disentangle the effects of unfamiliarity from those of transport costs, as both effects are 
presumably increasing functions of geographic distances. 
This study attempted to disentangle the two effects, using historic and 
systematic differences of uncertainty-aversion across countries. It showed that high 
uncertainty-aversion countries trade disproportionately less with distant partners than 
gravity models predict, and the results are driven by the group of differentiated   19
products, thus identifying a new “unfamiliarity channel” through which geographic 
distances affect trade volumes. This suggests that geographic distance can create, in 
addition to transport costs, informational and psychological frictions in long-distance 
international trade. These frictions interact with uncertainty aversion to cause the 
“mystery of the missing trade” (Trefler 1995). Using Frankel and Romer’s (1999) 
methodology, the study also showed that national uncertainty-aversion negatively affects 
per capita income by reducing trade openness for geographically open countries. 
One of the policy implications from the findings is that, in high uncertainty-
aversion countries, it is efficiency-improving for government to subsidize some export-
promoting activities, as well as to improve the communication and interaction with 
distant and unfamiliar countries, so as to minimize the negative consequences of being 
culturally uncertainty-averse. This is not an easy task. Eichengreen and Irwin (1996) 
show that bilateral trade flows are very persistent and history dependent. As a matter of 
fact, the effect of uncertainty version on long-distance trade has not been decreasing 
even though communication costs have dropped substantially. If people do not want to 
interact, then they will not, no matter how low the costs. As Guiso et al. (2004) argue, 
people believe what they want to believe. This, however, also suggests that the benefits 
would be huge, as familiarity erodes only slowly once it is established. The findings here 
also suggest that such policy measures would be most productive and immediate for 
those countries that are geographically more open to trade.  
One must be careful not to overstate the direct effect of national uncertainty-
aversion on long-distance trade. The coefficients estimated include indirect feedback 
effects as well as that high uncertainty-aversion countries trade less with distant 
countries, which reduces interactions and reinforces unfamiliarity, which further reduces 
trade, and so on. 
Finally, international trade data from prior to World War II can shed additional 
light on the topic examined in this study. Estevadeordal et al. (2003) document the 
boom and bust of world trade from 1870 to 1939, as international trade was in some 
periods promoted and in other periods distorted by payment frictions, transport costs,   20
and commercial policy. Prior to the war, there was no significance improvement of 
communication technologies, and thus unfamiliarity was relatively stable over the period.  
Through examining the 1870 -1913, period when transport costs dropped substantially, 
as well as the 1929-1939 period, when transport costs rose again, it should be possible to 
directly disentangle the two effects (i.e., transport costs versus unfamiliarity). A 
prediction we can make is that the coefficient on the interaction term should be stable 
between 1870 and 1939, whereas the coefficient on distance should go down first and 
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Appendix:  Measuring National Uncertainty Aversion 
 
To construct the Uncertainty Avoidance Indicator (UAI), Hofstede uses the answers of 
respondents to the three basic questions that follow. (He asked other questions as well in the 
survey in relation to uncertainty-aversion, but by factor analysis these three turn out to provide 
most of the information.) 
(a) Rule Orientation: Agreement with the statement “Company rules should not be 
broken – even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interest” (1 for strongly agree 
and 5 for strongly disagree) 
Motivation: Rule is a mechanism invented by human beings, since the primitive era, to 
stabilize the present and future, minimize undesirable uncertainty, and hold organizations 
together. The disagreement with the “rule orientation” statement thus indicates a higher level of 
tolerance for ambiguity, by allowing the breaking of rules upon unexpected and unstructured 
situations.  “Rule” is not a bad word per se, but it is usually perceived negatively, as it is 
sometimes associated with bureaucracy and red tape. The answer to this question is highly 
correlated with formality in judicial procedures (data from Djankov et al. 2003). 
(b) Employment stability: Employees’ statement that they intend to continue with the 
company for more than X years 
Motivation: The “employment stability” statement reflects modern human beings’ 
attitude toward situations of ambiguity, in a employer-employee context. The answers to this 
question are strongly correlated with the answers to the “rule orientation” statement. Later 
survey also found that the intention is consistent with actual action. The answer to this question 
is highly correlated with the regulation of the labor market (data from Botero et al. 2004). 
(c) Stress: as expressed in the mean answer to the question “How often do you feel 
nervous or tense at work” (1 for “I always feel this way” and 5 for “I never feel this way”) 
Motivation: The question about stress is less familiar to economists but is a well-
researched topic in social psychology literature. It taps a fundamental phenomenon in human life. 
Stress and anxiety are states of mind and body, or anxiety about the future, and they 
corresponds to the state of preparation for aggression in primitive people, released through acts of 
arbitrary aggression into unknown territory, and accumulated when the social norms and rules 
forbid them from overt aggression. The medical community commonly believes that stress and   26
anxiety are caused mainly by the fear of uncertainty in the future, which is also the main 
difference of it from another psychological illness, depression, which is caused by the belief that 
the future is doomed (certain) to be hopeless. Therefore, ceteris paribus, people in an uncertainty-
avoidance society would generally accumulate more stress. The answer to this question is highly 
consistent with cross-country medical surveys, which suggests that it is a social problem rather 
than a corporate problem. 
To make the contribution of each question roughly equal, Hofstede uses the following 
formula to adjust the weights and compute the aggregate score of national uncertainty aversion: 
UAI = 300 – 30 (mean score rule orientation) – (% intending to stay less than 5 years ) – 40 
(mean stress score)   27












Greece   112 0.1  0.4  1.5 
Portugal   104 1.1  94.1  0.0 
Guatemala   101 4.9  94.0  0.0 
Uruguay   100 1.9  59.5  0.0 
Belgium   94 0.4  90.0  1.1 
El Salvador   94 2.4  96.2  0.0 
Japan   92 0.9  0.6  0.0 
Yugoslavia   88 1.0  4.0  19.0 
Peru   87 2.7  95.1  0.0 
Argentina   86 2.7  91.6  0.2 
Chile   86 1.9  82.1  0.0 
Costa Rica   86 5.8  90.5  0.0 
France   86 2.4  76.4  3.0 
Panama   86 5.2  85.0  4.5 
Spain   86 0.1  96.9  0.0 
South Korea   85 12.2  3.9  0.0 
Turkey   85 0.0  0.1  99.2 
Mexico   82 1.2  94.7  0.0 
Israel   81 0.2  1.0  8.0 
Colombia   80 0.9  96.6  0.2 
Brazil   76 4.0  87.8  0.1 
Venezuela   76 1.0  94.8  0.0 
Italy   75 0.4  83.2  0.1 
Austria   70 6.5  88.8  0.6 
Pakistan   70 0.8  0.5  96.8 
Ecuador   67 1.9  96.4  0.0 
Germany   65 46.4  35.0  0.0 
Thailand   64 0.2  0.4  3.9 
Finland   59 93.1  0.1  0.0 
Iran   59 0.0  0.1  97.9 
Switzerland   58 43.2  52.8  0.3 
Netherlands   53 42.4  42.6  1.0 
Australia   51 23.5  29.6  0.2 
Norway   50 97.8  0.3  0.1 
New Zealand   49 37.9  18.7  0.0 
South Africa   49 39.0  10.4  1.3 
Canada   48 29.6  46.6  0.6 
Indonesia   48 4.8  2.7  43.4 
United States   46 43.6  30.0  0.8   28
Philippines   44 3.8  84.1  4.3 
India   40 1.1  1.3  11.6 
Malaysia   36 1.4  2.8  49.4 
Ireland   35 1.1  95.3  0.0 
United Kingdom   35 16.1  13.1  1.4 
Hong Kong   29 7.5  7.9  0.5 
Sweden   29 68.4  1.4  0.1 
Denmark   23 95.2  0.6  0.2 
Jamaica   13 55.5  9.6  0.1 
Singapore   8 2.6  4.7  17.4 
              
Correlation with 
UAI  -  –0.4860  0.5  –0.0473 
 
Note: Uncertainty aversion data are from Hofstede (1980, 2001). Religion data are from 
La Porta et al. (1997) and originally from Barrett (1982). Countries in the list are sorted 
by uncertainty aversion indicator (from highest to lowest). 
 
   29
Table 2: Unfamiliarity and long-distance trade 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Ln (Exports) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6) (7)   




















          
Distance  -1.1221 -0.9972 -1.2930 -1.4166 -1.3006  -1.2900 -1.2817 
  (0.0433)*** (0.0445)*** (0.0269)*** (0.0909)*** (0.0299)***  (0.0272)*** (0.0269)*** 
          
-0.0041 -0.0022 -0.0031 -0.0075 -0.0037  -0.0032 -0.0062  Distance × 
Exporter UAI  (0.0011)*** (0.0013)*  (0.0010)*** (0.0008)*** (0.0010)***  (0.0010)*** (0.0014)***
          
-0.0006 -0.0008           Distance× 
Importer UAI  (0.0011) (0.0013)          
          
Exporter UAI   -0.0100        
   (0.0011)***       
          
Importer UAI   -0.0064        
   (0.0010)***       
          
Distance×Finance       0.0032    
      ( 0 . 0 0 2 1 )     
          
Distance×GDP/pc         - 0 . 1 0 5 7    
        (0.052)**   
          
Exporter/Importer 
Fixed Effects  Yes No Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Fixed Effects  Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
          
Observations  66,814 66,814 171,594  65,397 144,338  171,000  171,594 
R-Squared  0.8238 0.7675 0.7782 0.8855 0.8025  0.7778 0.7778 
 
Exporter- and importer-specific characteristics (for which coefficients are not reported): sharing a common language, a 
common border, or a common colonizer after 1945; having a current colonial relationship, a previous colonial relationship, or a   30
common country; number of landlocked countries in the pair; number of islands in the pair; and common membership in 
GATT/WTO, a regional FTA, or a currency union. 
 
Country-specific characteristics (for which coefficients are not reported): log of real GDP for both importers and exporters. 
Log of real GDP per capita for both importers and exporters are also controlled for when exporter and importer dummies are 
not included, as are log products of land area. 
 
Instrumental variables: Proportion of Catholic, Protestant, and Muslim in the population. The IV regression is estimated with 
the GMM technique. 
 
Notes:  
1.  The basic regression model is specified as follows:  
 
Ln (Export Volume x,i,t ) = Ln (Distancex,i )(β1 + β2 × UAIx+  β3 × UAIi) + Extended Set of Gravity Model Control + 
Origin Dummiesx +  Destination Dummiesi  + Year Dummiest + εi,j,t 
 
Subscripts x and i denote exporting and importing countries, respectively, and t is the year of observation. The dependent 
variable is logarithm of yearly export volume from country x to country i in year t. 
2. Both transport costs and unfamiliarity are measured by logarithm of geographic distance between a pair of exporter 
and importer. The empirical design creates the following interpretation of the coefficients. β1 captures the transport cost 
effects because the magnitude of the effects are constant across trade routes. β2 and β3 capture the differential effects of 
unfamiliarity on export volumes, because distance effects are allowed to vary between uncertainty-averse and uncertainty-
tolerant exporters/importers. 
3. The gravity model is estimated using pooled yearly data from year 1970 to year 2000. Fixed-effects by year are 
controlled for, and the standard errors reported are adjusted to be robust to potential clustering of residuals by country-
pairs. 
4. In the “Extended Gravity Model Control Set”, fully following Rose (2004), dummies are included for whether a country-
pair shares a common language, a common border, a common country, or a common colonizer (either presently or in the 
past); for a current colonial relationship and for a colonial relationship in the past; and for country-pairs both in 
GATT/WTO, in the same currency union, and in the same regional trade agreement, respectively. The regression also 
controls for whether either of the two countries is landlocked or an island. 
5. The main regressions include country dummies for exporters and importers respectively, to remove the origin-specific 
and destination-specific effects. Results are compared to those obtained using the traditional approach by controlling for 
country-specific factors directly (i.e., log product of real GDP, log product of GDP per capita, and log product of land 
area, as well as UAI for both importers and exporters).   31
Table 3: Differentiated commodities vs. homogeneous commodities 
 
   
Dependent Variable: Ln (Export) 
 
  Conservative Classification Liberal  Classification 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)   
  Org. Ref.  Dif. Org.  Ref. Dif. 
           
Year 1970           
           
-0.0007 -0.0040  -0.0053  -0.0034  -0.0039  -0.0049  Distance × 
Exporter UAI  (0.0019) (0.0015)*** (0.0014)*** (0.0017)** (0.0015)**  (0.0013)***
           
Observations  3074  3812  4292  3437 3775 4272 
R-Squared  0.619  0.670  0.754  0.643 0.677 0.756 
           
Year 1980           
           
0.0032 -0.0050  -0.0053  -0.0010 -0.0027 -0.0051  Distance × 
Exporter UAI  (0.0018)* (0.0014)***  (0.0013)*** (0.0017)  (0.0014)*  (0.0013)***
           
Observations  3363  4395  5142  3753 4368 5123 
R-Squared  0.604  0.706  0.754  0.625 0.714 0.755 
           
Year 1990           
           
0.0011 -0.0025  -0.0059  -0.0017 -0.0015 -0.0062  Distance × 
Exporter UAI  (0.0017)  (0.0012)** (0.0012)*** (0.0016) (0.0012) (0.0012)***
           
Observations  3774  4908  5692  4120 4934 5671 
R-Squared  0.608  0.731  0.788  0.634 0.735 0.790 
           
           
Exporter/Importer 
Fixed effects  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
 
Country-Pair Specific Characteristics (for which coefficients are not reported):   sharing a 
common language, a common border, a common colonizer after 1945, current colonial 
relationship, previous colonial relationship, common country, number of landlocked in the pair, 
number of islands in the pair, GATT/WTO, Regional FTA, Currency Union.   
 
Notes: 
1. For model specification, please refer to notes underneath Table 2.  
2. Commodities are sorted into three categories according to Rauch (1999): organized exchange 
(Org.), reference priced (Ref.), and differentiated (Dif.), at the three- and four-digit SITC level.  
Referenced priced commodities are those for which prices can be quoted without knowing the 
identity of the producers. Because ambiguities arose that were sometimes sufficiently important 
to affect the classification at the three- or four-digit level, both ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ 
classifications were made, with the former minimizing the number of three- and four-digit 
commodities that are classified as either organized exchange or reference priced and the latter 
maximizing those numbers.    32
Table 4: Trade and income 
 





Dependent Variable: Actual trade openness % in 1985 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
         
2.8583  2.7283 5.9589  2.1126 5.9332  Geographic Openness 
%  (0.7731)*** (0.5716)***  (1.1708)*** (0.8083)**  (1.5799)***
         
UAI    -0.8422 0.3699  -0.7542 0.3665 
    (0.2695)*** (0.3202) (0.2203)*** (0.3158) 
         
   -0.0509   -0.0509  Geographic Openness 
× UAI     (0.0177)***  (0.0176)***
         
Ln population       -0.4352  -0.5350 
       (2.7033)  (2.3057) 
         
Ln Area       -5.8505  0.1031 
       (4.6688)  (4.5125) 
         
Observations  50  50 50  50 50 
R Squared  0.5152  0.6783 0.7902  0.7135 0.7903 
 
Panel B: Openness and Income 
 
  
Dependent Variable: Log of income per worker in 1985 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 





















         
0.0238 0.0115  0.0081 0.0081  0.0059  Actual Openness 
%  (0.0092)** (0.0074)  (0.035)**  (0.0032)**  (0.0014)***
         
Ln Population  -0.0357 -0.0587  -0.0662 -0.0644  -0.0527 
  (0.1118) (0.1033)  (0.1010) (0.0994)  (0.0727) 
         
Ln land area  0.1095 0.2108  0.1482 0.1490  0.1053 
  (0.0550)* (0.1457)  (0.0683)**  (0.0588)**  (0.0463)** 
         
Latitude        0.0216 
        (0.0026)***
         
Observations  50 50  50 50  50 
R-Squared  0.1626 -  -  -  - 
OIR- p value  - -  0.4206  0.7290  0.4451 
 
Note: In Panel A, actual trade openness is regressed against geographic openness (as defined in 
Frankel and Romer 1999) and uncertainty aversion (as measured by Hofstede). Economy size is 
controlled for by including population and land area.  In Panel B, log of income per worker is   33
regressed against trade openness (%), population, land area, and latitude. In Column (2), actual 
trade openness is instrumented by geographic openness. In Columns (3), (4), and (5), UAI is also 
included in the instrumental variable set. IV regressions are estimated using GMM techniques. 
Wherever available, p -values of over-identifying restrictions are also reported. 
 